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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard When It 
Denied The Motion To Amend 
A Introduction 
The district court applied an incorrect standard when ruling on the state's 
motion to amend the charge in this case from "statutory" rape to forcible rape, 
and therefore committed reversible error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-12.) 
Blankenship first argues that the court lacked jurisdiction over the statutory rape 
charge by application of the statute of limitation, and therefore it also lacked 
jurisdiction to grant an amendment. (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-7.) This 
argument fails because, even conceding that the statute of limitations barred a 
conviction for "statutory" rape, such bar did not deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction to consider amendment to a charge not barred by the statute of 
limitation. 
Blankenship next argues that the motion to amend was moot. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8.) He has failed to cite any legal authority for this 
argument, and application of actually existing law shows this claim to be 
meritless. 
Blankenship next argues the merits of the district court's decision. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 8-11.) His argument ignores defects in the district 
court's decision, however. These defects show that the district court committed 
reversible error by applying an incorrect legal standard. 
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Blankenship next contends that the district court should be affirmed on the 
basis that the state's motion to amend lacked specificity. (Respondent's brief, 
pp. 11-13.) This ground for denying the motion was neither raised to nor decided 
by the district court and the district court decided the merits of the motion. The 
alleged lack of specificity in the motion is not a proper alternative basis for 
upholding the court's ruling on the merits. 
Finally, Blankenship argues that the district court has unfettered discretion 
to deny amendment. (Respondent's brief, p. 13.) This argument is without legal 
merit. Even if the court's discretion to deny the motion were unfettered, the court 
did not here deny the motion on the basis of an exercise of such discretion but 
upon a certain analysis that is contrary to the existing legal standard. 
Blankenship's attempt to make all denials of amendment beyond the purview of 
appellate review should be rejected. 
B. The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Consider The Motion To Amend 
"[T]he time within which an offense is committed" is "a jurisdictional fact in 
all cases subject to limitation." State v. Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, 533, 195 P. 
1080, 1081 (1921). However, "it does not necessarily follow that the court is 
without jurisdiction to proceed in a case though the indictment or information 
alleges the offense was committed prior to the statutory period." kl at 534, 195 
P. at 1081-82. Thus, where the charging document indicates the crime was 
committed outside the applicable limitation period, "upon the trial the state must 
prove the commission of the offense within the statutory period, or the existence 
of conditions which preserve the right in the state to prosecute after the time 
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period limited by the statute." kl at 534, 195 P. at 1082. See also State v. 
Morris, 81 Idaho 267, 271-72, 340 P.2d 447, 449-50 (1959) (tolling of the statute 
of limitations is fact to be "tried with other issues and upon its determination 
depends the jurisdiction of the court."). Because the charging of a crime outside 
the applicable limitation period merely imposes upon the state the burden of 
proving the jurisdictional fact at trial, Blankenship's argument that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the state's pre-trial motion to amend is meritless. 
The rules of procedure allow the amendment of a charging document up 
to the point the prosecution rests at trial. I.C.R. 7(e). A jurisdictional defect in a 
charging document may be cured by amendment. See State v. Halbesleben, 
139 Idaho 165, 75 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2003) (motion raising claim of jurisdictional 
defect in different case was raised "when the prosecutor could have yet 
amended the indictment to cure the defect"). Because the trial court had 
jurisdiction to consider the state's motion to amend up to the point it rested at 
trial, Blankenship's claim it lacked jurisdiction to consider the state's pre-trial 
motion to amend is without merit. 
C. Blankenship Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Mootness Doctrine Is 
Relevant 
Blankenship claims the state's motion to amend was rendered moot by 
the district court's granting of dismissal. (Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8.) Because 
Blankenship at no point articulates or attempts to apply the legal standards 
regarding mootness, his argument is difficult to discern. (Id.) Application of the 
legal standards regarding mootness shows this argument to be meritless. 
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"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." State v. 
Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). Whether 
the state could amend its information to charge an offense not barred by the 
statute of limitation (and therefore avoid dismissal) presents a real and 
substantial controversy capable of judicial relief. 
D. The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard To The 
State's Motion To Amend 
The state contends that because the district court failed to consider 
whether Blankenship would be prejudiced at trial, it failed to apply the proper 
standard. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) Blankenship asserts in a footnote that he 
"disagrees" with the state's assertion that State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 266 
P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2011), stands for the proposition that trial prejudice is the 
relevant prejudice standard. (Respondent's brief, p. 11 n.11.) He articulates no 
reason he "disagrees" and cites no law as support for his disagreement. Review 
of the applicable cases shows Blankenship's "disagreement" is based on 
nothing. 
"The court may permit" the state to amend in information "if no additional 
or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced." I.R.E. 7(e). The rule's "reference to prejudice to substantial rights 
means prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend against the charge." 
Herrera, 152 Idaho at 31, 266 P.3d at 506 (emphasis added). The Idaho Court 
of Appeals cited State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709-10, 215 P.3d 414, 429-
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30 (2009), as "holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the State to amend 
its indictment because he had 'more than adequate time to prepare his 
defense."' Herrera, 152 Idaho at 31, 266 P.3d at 506. In Severson the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the amendment at issue (adding suffocation as a 
possible mechanism by which Severson accomplished the charged murder) did 
not "prejudice any of Severson's substantial rights" because Severson had "more 
than adequate time to prepare his defense" and the amendment did not subject 
Severson to double jeopardy. Severson, 147 Idaho at 709-10, 215 P.3d at 429-
30. Thus, the amendment met the due process requirements of sufficient notice 
to "prepare his defense and to protect the defendant from a subsequent 
prosecution for the same act." Severson, 147 Idaho at 709,215 P.3d at 429. 
As in Herrera and Severson, the amendment to the information would 
have provided Blankenship with adequate time to prepare his defense and did 
not put him at risk of double jeopardy. As in Severson, the amendment in this 
case was to "merely allege[] additional means by which the defendant may have 
committed the crime." kl See also State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 57-60, 740 
P.2d 1039, 1042-45 (Ct. App. 1987) (amendment to information to include age of 
victim in order to reflect statutory rape as alternative way of committing rape was 
proper). Because the proposed amendment was merely to assert an "additional 
means" by which Blankenship accomplished the rape he was already charged 
for, and the amendment would not have deprived Blankenship of his due 
process right to adequate notice to prepare his defense and assure against 
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double jeopardy, the district court erred by concluding the amendment would 
prejudice Blankenship's due process rights. 
The district court did not find that the amendment would in any way 
infringe upon Blankenship's ability to present his defense. Rather, its finding was 
that Blankenship was denied the opportunity to conduct cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing regarding a single part of the victim's testimony. Such cross-
examination was not necessary for a fair trial (and in fact would have been 
denied had the state presented the matter to a grand jury). Because cross-
examination of a state's witness prior to trial is not necessary for adequate trial 
preparation, the district court erred by denying the motion to amend .1 
E. Blankenship's Argument That The State's Motion Lacked Specificity Is Not 
An Alternative Ground For Affirming The District Court's Ruling On The 
Merits Of The State's Motion 
An appellate court "may affirm the district court's decision if an alternative 
legal basis supports it." Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway 
Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 201 O); see also Row v. 
State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001). The district court denied 
1 The Severson Court also rejected an argument that the amendment was 
improper because the grand jury did not indict him for suffocating, as opposed to 
poisoning, his wife. Compare Severson, 147 Idaho at 707-08, 215 P.3d at 427-
28 (Severson's argument) with id. at 709 n.17, 215 P.3d at 429 n. 17 (rejecting 
argument that facts found by grand jury control where crime is the same crime). 
See also Banks, 113 Idaho at 57-60, 740 P.2d at 1042-45 (holding that 
alternative means of committing rape set forth in subsections of rape statute are 
not different crimes but merely alternate ways of proving lack of consent to sex 
act). These cases are dispositive of Blankenship's arguments that proof at the 
preliminary hearing was relevant to the motion to amend and that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the sex was not 
consensual. 
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the state's motion not on procedural grounds, but on the merits. (R., pp. 105-
11.) Blankenship's argument that the state's motion was insufficiently specific 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-13), would not result in affirmation of the merits of the 
court's ruling, but only remand for a more definite motion. A claim that a motion 
provided inadequate notice is generally an issue that cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522, 236 P.3d 1277, 1282 
(2010). The claim that the motion was not specific is thus not an alternative 
basis for affirming the lower court's ruling on the merits and is improperly raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
Moreover, Blankenship's contention that the motion "lacked specificity" is 
without merit. The state's motion to amend was for the purpose of alleging 
forcible rape. (R., p. 103; 8/9/12 Tr., p. 8, L. 14-p. 13, L. 6.) There is nothing in 
the record to indicate that the parties or the court were in any way confused 
about the scope or intent of the state's motion. Counsel's new-found confusion 
as to what court action the motion sought is not a viable alternative ground for 
affirming the district court's order. 
F. The District Court Does Not Have Discretion To Deny The Motion To 
Amend For No Legally Cognizable Reason Whatsoever 
Blankenship argues that the language of the rule, that a court "may 
permit" an amendment if no new offense is charged and there is no prejudice 
gives the district court discretion to deny a motion to amend even absent a new 
charge or prejudice. (Respondent's brief, p. 13.) Blankenship asserts this claim 
in relation to the state's request for relief, apparently arguing that because the 
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district court has discretion to deny the motion even absent a different offense 
being charged or prejudice being shown, if this court finds error it should remand 
for the court to exercise its discretion and still deny amendment. (Id.) This 
interpretation of the rule is incorrect. Even if the court had discretion to deny 
amendment on grounds other than articulated in the rule, such discretion is not 
boundless. 
The rule "permits the state" to amend its information so long as it does not 
allege a new or different charge or prejudice the defendant. State v. Seiber, 117 
Idaho 637, 638, 791 P.2d 18, 19 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). It is the 
defendant's burden of showing prejudice. State v. Tribe, 126 Idaho 610, 612, 
888 P.2d 389, 391 (Ct. App. 1994). Ultimately it is the state's charge and the 
state's charging document. Absent some prejudice or infringement of rights 
demonstrated by the defendant, as set forth in the rule, there is no reason to 
deny amendment. 
Even if the district court has discretion to deny a motion to amend absent 
a new or different charge or prejudice, denial of a motion to amend is not 
something to deny on a whim. In reviewing a trial court's exercise of discretion, 
the appellate court considers (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
Because the concern of the rule is preventing amendments that charge new or 
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different crimes or that prejudice the ability to provide a defense at trial, 
discretion is only exercised within that context. Here the district court acted 
outside that context and, doing so, failed to perceive the scope of its discretion 
and acted outside that scope. Blankenship has failed to articulate another 
ground within that scope that should be considered by the district court. He has 
therefore failed to show that there are additional matters of discretion that should 
be considered on remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests that this Court reverse the district court and remand for 
further proceedings on an amended charge of rape that includes forcible rape 
under I.C. § 18-6101(3) and/or (4). 
DATED this 15th day of July, 20 
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